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In this dissertation we have focused on two aspects of dynamic macroeconomics:
the role of demographics and demographic change as one of the main determinants
of intergenerational redistribution, and the impact of public capital on economic
growth.
7.1 Realistic demographics in overlapping generations
models
In Part I of this dissertation, we developed an extended version of the Blanchard-
Yaari-type overlapping generations (OLG) model. We incorporated a general de-
scription of the mortality process, overcoming one of the main drawbacks of the
standard model: the perpetual youth assumption. In Chapter 2 we showed that in-
corporating a realistic demographic structure is quite feasible as long as we restrict
our attention to a small open economy facing a constant world interest rate. One of
the most attractive features of our extended model is that at the level of individual
households, a realistic description of the mortality process reinstates the classic life-
cycle saving insights of Modigliani and co-workers. The added complexity does
not destroy the main strength of simple theoretical models, we can still analytic-
ally track the effect of various macroeconomic shocks on the main variables in the
model, both on the individual as on the aggregate level.
The recently developed tractable OLG models with realistic demographics (like
Kalemni-Ozcan et al. (2000) and Boucekkine et al. (2002)) have not yet been ap-
plied to welfare analysis of policy shocks and exogenous shocks, this in contrast to
the perpetual youth models (see e.g. Heijdra and Meijdam (2002) and Bovenberg
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(1993)). Using our standard model in Chapter 2, we find that there are significant
differences in welfare effects of different shocks between the perpetual youth mod-
els and models with a realistic mortality process. First of all, transition is much
faster in models with realistic demographics than in models with the perpetual
youth assumption, because expected remaining lifetimes are much lower. Second,
the perpetual youth model neglects the fact that old generations do not value fu-
ture income gains or losses as high as new or unborn generations, because the con-
ditional survival function is equal for all cohorts. Finally, we have demonstrated
that the demographic details do not ‘wash out’ at the aggregate level. The impulse-
response functions for the different shocks are quite different for the Blanchard and
the Gompertz-Makeham models, especially the ones for per capita consumption
and financial assets.
In Chapter 3 we used the extended OLG model to analyse the effects on the
economic growth performance of a small open economy of demographic shocks of
the type and magnitude that hit the Western world over the last decades. Follow-
ing Lucas (1988), we assumed that schooling is the main mechanism that causes
growth. Individuals spend their first years at school, which increases their pro-
ductivity and earnings potential later in life. Our analysis shows that only for a
unrealistically strong intergenerational knowledge spillover, policy changes and
demographic shocks lead to a permanent higher (or lower) growth rate. Moreover,
if the intergenerational spillover is unrealistically large, the link between longevity
and economic growth is non-monotonic. A higher life expectancy at birth causes a
lower long-run growth rate in most developed countries.
As a second application we extended the basic framework of Chapter 2 with a
retirement decision as proposed by Sheshinski (1978) and a pension system that fits
the stylised facts of Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004, 2005). A consumption and leisure
loving individual chooses a retirement age that maximises his lifetime utility. With
our simple model we analysed the effects of a baby bust and a longevity shock
on a hypothetical economy. Both shocks lead to an ageing society and renders the
pension system unsustainable. We showed that at a microeconomic level it is under
most pension systems in the Western world optimal for people to retire at the age
where retirement benefits are first available (the early eligibility age, EEA). Large
policy reforms are necessary to make people work longer, without forcing them by
increasing the EEA.
Although our models are far too simple for real world policy evaluation, they
do provide useful insights. The main advantage of our models is that at least the
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steady state effects are analytically tractable. Moreover, it is usually even possible to
analytically distinguish between various phases in the transition process, making
it easier to understand what is happening when and more importantly why.
Various models already exist for policy evaluation. These large computable gen-
eral equilibrium models like the well-known Auerbach-Kotlikoff model (Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1987), see Altig et al. (2001) for an enhanced version of this model),
IMF’s MULTIMOD (Laxton et al., 1998) and specifically for the Netherlands, the
IMAGE model (Broer, 1999) often include highly detailed institutions and are cal-
ibrated to fit the real world as closely as possible. Their high level of detail and the
corresponding complexity is both a strength and a weakness of these models. The
advantage is that these models can be used for real world scenarios evaluations
and to determine the effect of various policy shocks on different agents. The disad-
vantage is that the high level of realism is bought at the cost of tractability; due to
their inherent complexity, the interpretation of the observed effect is very difficult.
A second drawback of these models is that they take a long time to solve and this
makes them ill-equipped for sensitivity analysis and quick calculations. Analytic-
ally tractable overlapping generation models do not suffer from these drawbacks
and if a realistic mortality process is incorporated, these models can take real in-
tergenerational links into account that will provide valuable insights in the ongo-
ing ageing process of the developed world. Furthermore, with relaxed assump-
tions, overlapping generation models will be better suited to analyse the historical
long-run relationship between demographic change and economic growth.
The drawbacks of these large scale CGE models are exactly the strengths of our
simple models. It is our opinion that the framework we develop in Chapter 2 and
the extensions in Chapters 3 and 4 are a useful addition to the large scale CGE-
models. Our models can be used to identify the main effects observed in the large
models and to better understand how these models work.
7.1.1 Limitations and future extensions
All three models share two common limitations: they only apply to an open eco-
nomy that faces an exogenous world interest rate and we need the existence of an
actuarially fair insurance system. Unfortunately, it is far from trivial to drop these
assumptions.
As we showed in the Chapter 2, a mortality process with a realistic probabil-
ity of death results in a life-cycle profile of savings. If we combine this life-cycle
savings profile with ageing, it is expected that ageing will result in a lower capital
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supply (IMF, 2004; Poterba, 2001). If capital is not perfectly mobile or if the ageing
problem is of such a scale that it becomes a global phenomenon, the assumption of
an exogenous interest rate might be too strong. The introduction of a realistic mor-
tality process in a closed economy is complicated by the fact that exact aggregation
of the consumption function is impossible. Of course, the steady state can still be
characterized analytically, it is the same as the steady state of the open economy
with one extra restriction, namely that foreign assets should be zero. The trans-
itional effects of various shocks are, however, much more difficult to compute due
to the fact that equilibrium factor prices will generally be time-varying. In the near
future we wish to investigate whether approximate aggregation of the key beha-
vioural relationships is feasible for particular shock parametrizations. If that fails,
numerical methods will be employed to characterize transitional dynamics.
The other limitation concerns the assumed availability of actuarially fair annu-
ities that agents can use to insure themselves against dying indebted. Mitchell et
al. (1999) document how unattractive private annuity contracts are in the United
States, making the assumption of actuarial fair notes rather far-fetched, even in
modern developed financial markets (see also Davidoff et al., 2005). Things be-
come even worse if one realises that one objective of introducing realistic demo-
graphics is to explain the historical non-monotonic relation between demographic
change, human capital accumulation and economic growth (Kalemni-Ozcan et al.,
2000; Boucekkine et al., 2002; Fuster et al., 2005). Especially in a historical context,
the assumption of actuarially fair annuities is unjustified. Kalemni-Ozcan and Weil
(2002) present an overlapping generation model that they use to analyse the effect
of mortality change on retirement without insurance possibilities. Unfortunately,
to keep the model analytically tractable they have to assume that the mortality rate
is constant (Blanchard’s perpetual youth model) and that income and the interest
rate is high enough to prevent the liquidity constraint to be binding. They fall back
on simulation techniques to study a more complex version of their model, with a
realistic mortality rate. The whole problem boils down to solving a dynamic optim-
ization problem with constraints on a state variable; individuals are not allowed to
die in debt. This class of models is inherently difficult to solve, but since there is no
aggregate risk, only lifetime is stochastic, we expect that it is possible to solve the
macroeconomic model.
In conclusion, we hope that the extended Blanchard-Yaari model we construc-
ted will prove to be a useful addition to the toolbox of both theoretical economists
and policy practitioners alike. At least in the context of a small open economy, there
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is no justification whatsoever to use models based on a blatantly unrealistic descrip-
tion of demography. Had mortality not caught up with him, Benjamin Gompertz
would probably support that conclusion!
7.2 Public capital and economic growth: an empirical
analysis
In Part II of this dissertation we ignored intergenerational issues and focused en-
tirely on public capital, one of the determinants of economic growth. The central
issue in Chapter 5 and 6 was whether a robust long-run empirical relationship ex-
ists between public capital and economic performance.
Chapter 5 provides a review of the recent studies that examine the relation-
ship between public capital and economic growth. Although not all studies find a
growth-enhancing effect of public capital there is more consensus in the recent lit-
erature than in the older literature that public capital does spur economic growth.
The impact is also much lower than found by Aschauer (1989), which is generally
considered to be the starting point of this line of research.
Many studies report that there is heterogeneity: the effect of public investment
differs across countries, regions, and sectors. This is perhaps not a surprising res-
ult. After all, the effects of new investment spending will depend on the quantity
and quality of the capital stock in place. In general, the larger the stock and the
better its quality, the lower will be the impact of additions to this stock. Some stud-
ies also suggest that the effect of public investment spending may also depend on
institutional and policy factors. The network character of public capital, notably in-
frastructure, causes non-linearities. The effect of new capital will crucially depend
on the extent to which investment spending aims at alleviating bottlenecks in the
existing network.
Chapter 6 investigated whether it is possible to arrive at robust estimates of the
long-run output elasticity of public capital using internationally comparable ag-
gregate and industry data for a considerable number of developed countries. State
of the art econometric techniques and economic modelling insights were used to
correct for heterogeneity regarding time, country and industry. Unfortunately, we
had to conclude that stable output elasticity estimates based are elusive. The estim-
ated parameters vary wildly between equally plausible econometric specification
and range between -2 and 2. The aggregate estimates tend to be more stable, but
even those range between 0.04 and 1.13. While it is hard to discount cross-country
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variation, the cross-specification variation we found suggests extreme sensitivity
to conceptually innocuous specification choices. Overall, this suggests that pro-
duction function estimates of the impact of infrastructure are not well-suited to be
used for infrastructure policy recommendations.
The question arises why Chapter 5 concluded that ‘there is more consensus’ and
Chapter 6 concluded that the production function estimates vary wildly? There
are several possible reasons. First, most studies that use a production function
approach in a panel setting estimate a single equation for each country and take
the average for all countries. These studies tend to present only one specification
and as we showed in Chapter 6, it is possible to arrive at any outcome. Those
studies that use the cross-section variation in a panel setting usually do not present
elasticity estimates, but focus on the question whether the current public capital
stock is optimal.
7.2.1 Limitations and future research
There are a few problems that have not received much attention in the literature
on public capital and economic growth. Three of these problems are institutional
factors that play a role in the creation of public capital, the role of maintenance
on public capital, and the lack of sound theoretical foundations in most empirical
studies.
Part of the heterogeneity between countries and regions can be explained by the
large differences in the quantity and quality of the public capital stock. Attempts at
explaining existing differences in capital stocks are only in their infancy. A possible
complicating factor is that certain questionable political practices may determine
where and what is invested in public capital. According to Estache (2006, p. 5),
‘there is strong anecdotal evidence now that politics matter. Experiences in Asia,
Eastern Europe or Latin America show that politicians will never give up the con-
trol of a sector that buys votes in democratic societies. Moreover, in societies in
which corruption is rampant, they will not give up control of a sector involving
large amounts of money and in which contract award processes often provide op-
portunities for unchecked transactions.’ These practices are not confined to devel-
oping countries, others (e.g. Cadot et al., 2002 and Kemmerling and Stephan, 2002)
find also in industrialised countries evidence of pork barrel politics. Attempts that
try to explain differences between countries must take these political factors into
account.
As pointed out by Kalaitzidakis and Kalavitis (2005), in most theoretical stud-
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ies public capital deterioration is considered as an exogenously given technical re-
lationship, thereby neglecting a crucial choice concerning the implementation of
public investment decisions, namely the choice between investing in ‘new’ public
capital and extending the durability of the existing public capital stock via main-
tenance. There is a small, but very interesting line of literature on maintenance. In
contrast to standard results derived by endogenous growth models with public in-
frastructure, the optimal tax burden that maximizes the long-run growth rate of the
economy is now larger than the elasticity of infrastructure in the production func-
tion. The lack of studies that take maintenance into account can be explained by the
fact that published data on maintenance are very scarce due to inherent problems
in the measurement of the maintenance expenditures. Kalaitzidakis and Kalavitis
(2005) use data from a Canadian survey which contains evidence on maintenance
expenditures of both private firms and government organizations, to test the im-
pact of total public capital expenditures and their components on growth. Their
results indicate that the Canadian economy would benefit from a fall in total ex-
penditures on both ‘new’ capital and maintenance, and that the aggregate share of
maintenance in total expenditures should be lower over the period under consid-
eration.
A striking result is that only a few of the enormous bulk of studies on the output
effects of infrastructure base their estimates on solid theoretical models. A problem
is that the theoretical papers that link public capital to economic growth, starting
with the work of Uzawa (1974) usually neglect the channels through which infra-
structure affects economic growth. They simply postulate an aggregate production
function with public capital as an extra input. This neglects the usually complex
links, after all, government roads as such do not produce anything. A major excep-
tion are the spatial economics models. In these models extra public capital, mostly
infrastructure, reduces transportation costs, which boost productivity of the other
production factors.
Finally, we must conclude that although there is more consensus on public cap-
ital having a positive impact on economic growth, the size of the effect is still not
clear. Still, not all possible methods of research have been explored. What is certain
is that aggregate level methods are probably too crude to provide policy makers
with useful information.

